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a b s t r a c t
There seems to benodimensionof bodily awareness that cannot bedisrupted. To account for such variety,
there is a growing consensus that there are at least two distinct types of body representation that can
be impaired, the body schema and the body image. However, the deﬁnition of these notions is often
unclear. The notion of body image has attracted most controversy because of its lack of unifying positive
deﬁnition. The notion of body schema, onto which there seems to be a more widespread agreement,
also covers a variety of sensorimotor representations. Here, I provide a conceptual analysis of the body
schema contrasting it with the body image(s) as well as assess whether (i) the body schema can be
speciﬁcally impaired, while other types of body representation are preserved; and (ii) the body schema
obeys principles that are different from those that apply to other types of body representation.
© 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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Until the end of the XIXth century, bodily awareness was
onceived as a bundle of internal bodily sensations. In 1905
onnier ﬁrst introduced the term “schema” to refer to their
patial organization. Since then, almost all neurologists have
∗ Correspondence address: Transitions, New York University, 4 Washington
quare, 10003 New York, NY, USA.
E-mail address: fdv208@nyu.edu.
028-3932/$ – see front matter © 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
oi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2009.09.022agreed on the existence of mental representations of the body,
often called body schema or body image (or both at the same
time). However, there has been a widespread confusion about
the nature and the properties of these notions (Gallagher, 1986).a and body image—Pros and cons. Neuropsychologia (2009),
And this is not surprising, given the variety of ways we have
of relating to our bodies (e.g., through touch, vision, propri-
oception, motor behavior, semantic understanding, emotional
affect, etc.) and the variety of disorders of bodily awareness (see
Table 1).
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Table 1
Some disorders of bodily awareness.
Bodily disorders Deﬁnition
Alice in Wonderland Syndrome Distorted awareness of the size, mass, shape of the body or its position in space (including
macro/microsomatognosia and OBE)
Allochiria (or dyschiria) Mislocalization of sensory stimuli (tactile, visual, auditory) to the corresponding opposite half of the body
or space
Allodynia Pain due to a stimulus that does not normally produce pain
Anarchic hand sign Unintended but purposeful and autonomous movements of the upper limb and intermanual conﬂict
Anorexia nervosa Eating disorder characterized by self-starvation
Anosognosia Lack of awareness of one’s deﬁcits like hemiplegia
Autoscopy Experience of seeing one’s body in extrapersonal space
Autoprosopagnosia Inability to recognize one’s own face
Autotopagnosia Mislocalization of body parts and bodily sensations
Body form agnosia Deﬁcit of recognition of body parts
Body Integrity Identity Disorder (BIID) Urge to be amputated of one’s own perfectly healthy limb(s)
Body-speciﬁc aphasia Loss of lexical knowledge of body parts
Bulimia nervosa Eating disorder characterized by recurrent binge eating, followed by compensatory behavior.
Conversion disorder (hysteria) Functional disorder with no organic cause
Cotard syndrome Delusional belief that one is dead, does not exist, is putrefying or has lost one’s blood or internal organs
Deafferentation Loss of tactile and proprioceptive information
Depersonalization Altered, detached or estranged subjective experience
Dysmorphophobia Distorted perception of one’s self-appearance
Fading limb Lack of awareness of the presence and position of the limb if not seen
Finger agnosia Inability to individuate and recognize the ﬁngers
Gerstmann’s syndrome Finger agnosia, agraphia, acalculia and left-right confusion
Heautoscopy Visual hallucination of a double of oneself at a distance
Heterotopagnosia Designation of parts of the body of another person when asked to point towards one’s own body
Hyperalgesia Increased response to a stimulus that is normally painful
Hypochondrias Excessive somatic concern
Ideomotor apraxia Inability to execute or carry out skilled movements and gestures
Interoceptive agnosia Loss of pain feeling
Macro/microsomatognosia Distorted awareness of the size of the whole body or of body parts (bigger or smaller)
Mirror sign Inability to recognize one’s own image in the mirror
Misoplegia Hatred towards one’s own body parts
Motion sickness (or kinetosis) Vestibular balance disorder
Motor neglect Underutilisation of one side of the body
Numbsense Tactile deﬁcit with preserved tactually guided movements
Out of the body experience (OBE) Visual awareness of one’s own body from a location outside the physical body
Personal neglect Lack of attention towards one’s side of the body
Phantom limb Awareness of an amputated limb
Pusher syndrome Postural deviation towards the contralesional side
Prosopagnosia Deﬁcit of face recognition
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iSomatoparaphrenia (or asomatognosia or Alien Hand) Denial of ownership
Supernumerary limb Awareness of non-e
Tactile extinction Lack of awareness o
One might therefore be tempted to conclude that one single
ody representation cannot sufﬁce to account for such complexity.
hereneeds tobemore thanonemental representationof thebody.
ut how many? Two? Three? Four? Although there is a growing
onsensus that there are at least two distinct types of body repre-
entation, the body schema and the body image (Dijkerman & de
aan, 2007; Gallagher, 2005;Head&Holmes, 1911; Paillard, 1980),
here is still little agreement beyond that, aswe shall seehere. Some
ay conclude that we would be better off without these notions:
“We allow ourselves to speak of the body image and other such
scheme or ghosts, which, I think, we would well be rid of by
adopting a method of intellectual exorcism.” Spicker, 1975, p.
182
It is one thing to get rid of the confusion in the literature; it is
nother thing to get rid of the notions of the body schema and the
ody image themselves with no further argument. Just because it
s a “slippery issue”, as it has been suggested (Holmes & Spence,
005, p. 16), that does not mean that one should avoid it. Body rep-
esentations are not ghosts. Every single morning, they allow us toPlease cite this article in press as: de Vignemont, F. Body schem
doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2009.09.022
omb our hair, to grasp our cup of tea, and to enjoy the warm feel-
ng of the sun on our skin. And as soon as they are disturbed, we
uickly realize that they play an important role in our life. So yes,
e should adopt amethod of intellectual exorcism, but only to clar-
fy the conceptual landscape of the study of body representations.e’s body part
t limbs
le stimuli on the contralesional limb during simultaneous bilateral stimulation
Here, I shall review the dominant models of body representation,
namely, the neuropsychological taxonomies. I shall show the difﬁ-
culties encounteredby thesemodels, bothat theempirical level and
at the conceptual level. I shall then conclude by proposing a more
dynamicmodel basedonBayesianmechanismsofmultimodal inte-
gration.
1. Taxonomies of body representation
Bodily disorders can be encountered in various contexts, both
neurological (after brain lesion, peripheral lesion, migraine and
epileptic seizure) and psychiatric. There seems to be no dimension
of bodily awareness that cannot be disrupted (see Table 1). One of
themain reasons onemaywant to postulatemultiple types of body
representation is to account for such variety.
How to organize the diversity of syndromes that differ on so
many levels? For a long time, the syndromes were called “dis-
turbances of the body schema” in the neurological literature and
“disruptions of the body image” in the psychiatric literature (Denes,
1990). However, as noticed by Poeck andOrgass (1971, p. 255), “thea and body image—Pros and cons. Neuropsychologia (2009),
only obvious common denominator was that they had something
to do with the human body”.
First, one may try to classify them along the lines of their clin-
ical descriptions. Some bodily disorders result from deﬁcits, like
somatosensory loss in deafferentation. Others result from distor-
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ions, like the feeling of expanding inmacrosomatognosia. A further
istinction can be done among patients, depending on the level at
hich they acknowledge the disorder. In some cases, patients have
bnormal bodily experiences, but do not take their experiences at
ace value (e.g., ‘as if’ there were a limb). In other cases, patients
ave abnormal beliefs that are not grounded in abnormal bodily
xperiences (e.g., they mistake their index ﬁnger for their thumb).
inally, in other cases, patients have both abnormal experiences
nd abnormal beliefs (e.g., they feel, and believe, that it is not their
wn hand).
The neuropsychological principle of double dissociation can
rovide anotherway of classifying bodily disorders. A double disso-
iation is observed if a patient or group of patients is impaired on A,
ut not on B, and if another patient or group of patients is impaired
n B, but not on A. If A and B are two body-related tasks, then there
ust be two independent processing systems of body information,
hich can be functionally dissociated by lesions. I shall focus here
n two main taxonomies of body representation that are based on
his principle, but it isworth noting that there are other taxonomies
sing different criteria (e.g., short-term versus long-termbody rep-
esentations, cf. O’Shaughnessy, 1980; my body versus your body,
f. Felician, Ceccaldi, Didic, Thinus-Blanc, & Poncet, 2003).
The dyadic taxonomy (Dijkerman & de Haan, 2007; Gallagher,
005; Paillard, 1999; Rossetti, Rode, & Boisson, 1995): The dyadic
axonomy draws a distinction between the body schema and the
ody image. The body schema consists in sensorimotor representa-
ions of the body that guide actions. The body image groups all the
ther representations about the body that are not used for action,
hether they are perceptual, conceptual or emotional (body per-
ept, body concept and body affect, cf. Gallagher, 2005). Several
issociations have been proposed to ground the dyadic taxonomy,
uch as the double dissociation between deafferentation (disrup-
ion of body schema) and numbsense (disruption of body image)
Paillard, 1999).
The triadic taxonomy (Schwoebel & Coslett, 2005; Sirigu,
rafman, Bressler, & Sunderland, 1991): The triadic taxonomy
etains the dyadic taxonomy’s notion of body schema. That is,
t maintains that there is a sensorimotor representation based
n afferent and efferent information, but rejects the notion of
ody image because of its heterogeneity. Consequently, the body
mage is split up into two distinct body representations: the body
tructural description (or visuo-spatial body map) and the body
emantics. At the visuo-spatial level, the body image provides a
tructural description of the relationships between body parts
i.e. their boundaries, their proximity and their position relative
o each other). It is primarily based on vision, but also on somatic
erception. At the semantic level, the body image is primarily
onceptual and linguistic. It describes the functional purpose
f body parts and the categorical relationship between them
e.g., wrist and ankles are both joints). The triadic taxonomy is
rounded in the dissociation between apraxia (disruption of the
ody schema), autotopagnosia (disruption of the body structural
escription), and body-speciﬁc aphasia (disruption of the body
emantics).
The notion of body image has attracted most attention (and
ontroversy) because of its lack of unifying positive deﬁnition. The
ynamics of the body image varies from short-term body percept
o long-term body concepts. In addition, the body image can be
pplied both to one’s own body and to someone else’s body. And
t seems to be both non-conceptual (body percept) and conceptual
body concept). Why are all these aspects part of one single cat-Please cite this article in press as: de Vignemont, F. Body schem
doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2009.09.022
gory? It seems like the body image is just whatever is left over
fter we are done talking about the body schema. Consequently,
he dyadic taxonomy is not ﬁne-grained enough to account for the
omplexity of the body image. Yet, towhat extent should one break
own the body image into dissociable elements? There seems to be PRESS
logia xxx (2009) xxx–xxx 3
no end. So many dissociations are possible that three types of body
representations may not even sufﬁce.
In addition, what is a distinctive feature of the body schema
by contrast with the body image(s) for one author may be irrel-
evant for another. Three main criteria have been used to draw
the distinction between the different types of body representa-
tion: availability to consciousness (unconscious versus conscious);
dynamics (short-term versus long-term); functional role (action
versus perception). The weight of each criterion varies relative to
the author. For instance, Head & Holmes favour availability and
dynamics; Paillard exclusively highlights the importance of the
functional role;Gallagher combinesavailabilityand functional role;
Schwoebel & Coslett combine dynamics and functional role. It is no
surprise therefore that the very same notion can be ascribed oppo-
site properties by different authors. For instance, according to Cole
and Paillard (1995), it is the body image that is holistic, whereas
according to Gallagher (1995), it is the body schema.
It is more interesting to highlight what the taxonomies have in
common, than to analyze each view in its differences with the oth-
ers or to indeﬁnitely try to ﬁgure out the exact number of body
representations. Before ﬁghting over the dead corpse of the body
image, one should ﬁrst investigate in more detail the (seemingly
more robust) notion of a body schema. Despite their various dis-
agreements, both the dyadic and triadic taxonomies seem indeed
to agree on the existence of something called a body schema, dis-
tinct from something else, whatever that something else is called
(body image, body structural description, visuo-spatial body map,
body semantics, etc.). Furthermore, they both agree on the deﬁni-
tion of the body schema as a sensorimotor representation of the
body, highlighting a special relationship between the body schema
and action. No successful action is possible without a representa-
tion of one’s bodily parameters such as the size and the strength of
one’s limbs. It is thushighlyplausible fromanevolutionaryperspec-
tive that body information processing evolved ﬁrst to be used for
action, and if one wants to study body representations, one should
start with those that are action-oriented.
2. The Perception/Action model of body representations
There is one aspect on which almost all taxonomies seem to
agree, namely, the importance of functional roles in differentiat-
ing various types of body representation, and especially the role
of guiding action for the body schema (Gallagher, 2005; Paillard,
1999; Schwoebel & Coslett, 2005; Sirigu et al., 1991). This would
seem to track the well-founded Perception–Action functional dis-
tinction, which has been shown ﬁrst in vision (Milner & Goodale,
1995), but also later in audition (Belin & Zatorre, 2000), touch and
proprioception (Dijkerman & de Haan, 2007).
Contrary to common sense and much philosophy of perception,
human vision is not a unitary psychological activity, whose single
purpose is to yield a uniﬁed conscious picture of the visible fea-
tures of theworld. As shown by a variety of empirical evidence, one
and the same visual stimulus can be processed differently accord-
ing to the task one is engaged in. Ungeleider and Mishkin (1982)
ﬁrst distinguished theWhat-system in theventral streamdedicated
to object recognition and the Where-system in the dorsal stream
dedicated to object localization. Later, Goodale and Milner (1992)
distinguished the What-system in the ventral stream and the How-
system in the dorsal stream dedicated to visually guided actions.
They ground their distinction on a double dissociation between
two syndromes: optic ataxic patients who are able to make visuala and body image—Pros and cons. Neuropsychologia (2009),
judgments, but unable to reach and grasp objects, and visual form
agnosic patientswho are unable tomake visual judgments, but able
to reach and grasp objects. Further evidence for the dual model of
vision has been provided by studies on visual illusions in healthy
participants, such as the Müller–Lyer illusion, the Ponzo illusion,
 INGN
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he Titchener illusion or the hollow face illusion. For example, in
he hollow face illusion, participants perceive a 3D concave (or hol-
ow)mask as a convex (or protruding) face. If asked to quickly ﬂick a
arget magnet off the face, they directed their ﬁnger movements to
he actual or veridical location of the target rather than the appar-
nt location of it, which was 8 in. away (Kroliczak, Heard, Goodale,
Gregory, 2006).
Paillard was strongly inﬂuenced by the Perception–Action
odel of vision and applied it to the analysis of body represen-
ations. Following Ungerleider and Mishkin, he ﬁrst suggested
istinguishing “the identiﬁedbody” (le corps identiﬁé) and “the situ-
tedbody” (le corps situé) (Paillard, 1980).He then reﬁnedhismodel
nd made a distinction between ‘knowing where’ and ‘knowing
ow to get there’ (Paillard, 1991). In other words, the body image
s dedicated to perceptual identiﬁcation and recognition (e.g., body
art judgments) and the body schema is dedicated to action (e.g.,
nformationabout thebodynecessary tomovesuchasposture, limb
ize, and strength) (Dijkerman & de Haan, 2007; Paillard, 1999).
It should be noted, however, that the Perception–Action distinc-
ion has been criticized both on empirical and theoretical grounds.
t has been shown that in some circumstances, ataxic patients can
se visual information to guide their movements and that action
an be sensitive to certain types of visual illusions (for review, see
isella, Binkofski, Lasek, Toni, & Rossetti, 2006). However, what is
hallenged is not the hypothesis that there are two pathways, one
f which is dedicated to action. What is challenged is the hypoth-
sis that the two pathways work in isolation without interacting.
s we shall see, the same is true of body representations. A second
ine of counter-argument may come from the enactive approach,
hich rejects the computational dichotomy between perception
nd action (Hurley, 1998; Noë, 2004; O’Regan & Noë, 2001). On
his view, perceptual experiences constitutively depend on sen-
orimotor expectations. Hence, perceptual experiences are said to
e inseparable from the perceiver’s bodily activities. If this is true,
here should be no reason to defend the body schema/body image
istinction, and no way to dissociate them (for a full discussion
f the enactive approach of bodily experiences, see de Vignemont,
ubmitted for publication).
Therefore, the debate is whether we use a speciﬁc type of body
epresentation to program and guide actions, which is distinct
rom the one used in perception. Everybody agrees that we use
odily information in various contexts and for different purposes,
ncluding action guidance. But does that mean that each purpose
equires its ownpurpose-speciﬁcbody representation?Doesaction
ake a difference for the way the brain represents the body? In
ther words, one may agree that body representations can play
ifferent roles, without accepting that there are different types of
ody representation. A purely functional distinction between body
epresentations fails to logically exclude a single-process model,
hich would be more in line with the enactive approach. One has
o disentangle two possibilities: one and the same representation
sed for different functions or different representations speciﬁc
o each function. In order to argue for the latter hypothesis, one
eeds to show that: (i) action-oriented body representations can
e speciﬁcally impaired, while other types of body representation
re preserved; and (ii) action-oriented body representations obey
rinciples that are different from those that apply to non-action-
riented body representations. That shall be my agenda for the
emainder of the paper. But beforehand, I would like to explore
n more detail the notion of body schema deﬁned as a set of action-
riented body representations.Please cite this article in press as: de Vignemont, F. Body schem
doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2009.09.022
Let me start with the special case of reﬂective actions where
ne’s body is represented both as the goal of the action and as the
ffector of the action (e.g., scratching a bodypart). It is often unclear
n the deﬁnition of the body schema whether it represents both
oles, andwe shall see that it is especially unclear in some reﬂective PRESS
logia xxx (2009) xxx–xxx
actions like pointing to bodyparts. The body as a goal does not seem
to differ much from any other non-bodily goals. I can reach for my
head or I can reach for the book, and it does not seem right to say
that the body schema represents the book. Yet, when the action
is body-directed, there must be a sensorimotor representation of
the body as the goal. When I reach for the book, my movement is
guided by a visuo-motor representation of the book that recruits
the dorsal visual system. Similarly, it makes sense to assume that
when I reach for my head to scratch it, my movement is guided
by a proprioceptive-motor representation of the head that recruits
the body schema. A more interesting question, I think, is whether
it is the same type of body schema that represents both the bodily
effector and thebodilygoal. Inotherwords, is it possible forpatients
to be unable to reach for one body part, and yet be able to use
this body part to perform actions? Unfortunately, the two aspects
are rarely explicitly compared, but they seem to be dissociated in
patientswith numbsense for instance (Paillard,Michel, & Stelmach,
1983), aswe shall see later. This leadsme to the followingdeﬁnition
of action-oriented body representations:
A body representation is action-oriented if and only if it carries
information about the bodily effector (and the bodily goal in reﬂec-
tive actions) that is used to guide bodily movements.
The question is then to determine what bodily information is
required by action and how it is represented. I shall argue that
the Perception–Action distinction is orthogonal to the distinc-
tion between short-term and long-term body representations, and
between unconscious and conscious body representations.
The variety of dynamics and plasticity of body representations
is a recurrent question in the literature. It has even been used as a
key criterion to individuate distinct types of body representations
(Carruthers, 2008;Merleau-Ponty, 1945;O’Shaughnessy, 1980; but
also Head & Holmes, 1911; Schwoebel & Coslett, 2005). On the one
hand, there would be short-term on-line body representations (or
‘actual body’ cf.Merleau-Ponty), which include the representations
of the body posture at time t and which are constantly updated. On
the other hand, there would be long-term off-line body represen-
tations (or ‘habitual body’ cf. Merleau-Ponty), which represent the
long-term bodily properties such as the spatial organization of the
body parts and their respective size and which are relatively stable.
Say we all agree that if there is something like a body schema,
then it is action-oriented. Now, such a basic statement does not
imply that the body schema is a short-term body representation, as
it seems to be assumed by the triadic taxonomy for instance. Short-
term representations are by deﬁnition representations with a very
short life-scale. It is built up at time t, stored in working memory,
and erased at time t+1 by the next one. And true, tomove one’s arm
one needs to know its position at time t, and this information is no
longer true at t+1. Yet, to move one’s arm, one also needs to know
its size, which has not changed for the last 10 years. For example,
to switch on the light, you need to know the length of your arm in
order to determine how far you should stretch your arm. You also
need to know what types of movement your arm affords. Hence,
action recruits both short-term and long-term bodily information.
It is toocostly tocompute thesizeofbodyparts each timeone thinks
of moving. Rather, one may suggest that the body schema includes
not only short-term body representations, but also long-term body
representations.
Now, the question of consciousness is slightly more com-
plex, and more controversial. In the case of vision, the functional
distinction Perception–Action is tightly linked to the con-a and body image—Pros and cons. Neuropsychologia (2009),
trast conscious–unconscious. Milner and Goodale (2008) assume
a restrictive link between visual awareness and vision-for-
perception at the expense of vision-for-action. According to them,
visuo-motor representations are not accessible to consciousness.
That does not mean that one cannot be conscious of actions, but
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ne has no access to the visuo-motor representations that guide
he actions. On this view, the dorsal pathway is, in Pisella et al.’s
2000) terms, an “automatic pilot”. On this view, agnosic patients
ould have no conscious experience of the properties of stimuli
hat they can accurately grasp. However, this view is disputed in
he visual system literature and there is no empirical evidence in
avour of it. True, agnosic patients do not report the accurate length
f theobject they cangrasp. But thatdoesnot showthat theyarenot
ware of the length of the object. It is not because you cannot report
t that you are not aware of it (Block, 2007; Lamme, 2003; Simons
Rensink, 2005). It is one thing to say that visuo-motor represen-
ations do not require consciousness, and it is another thing to say
hat they can never be conscious. As far as the evidence goes, only
he former claim can be made for visually guided actions (Jacob &
e Vignemont, in press; Wallhagen, 2007).
The same debate takes place for body representations. Head
nd Holmes (1911) claimed that body schemata are unconscious,
hile thebody image is conscious. Similarly, according toGallagher
2005), the body schema operates automatically at the subpersonal
evel and can never become conscious as such. One does not pay
ttention to one’s limbs in movement, but to the world. But a lack
f attention is one thing and a lack of awareness is another. One
ay indeed suggest that while acting, one is aware of one’s body,
lthough the body stays in the background, or the margin, of con-
ciousness: “There is no moment in our conscious life when we are
ompletely unaware of our bodily posture, of the fact that we are
alking, standing, sitting, lying down.” (Gurwitsch, 1985, p. 31).
Even without claiming that the body schema is all the time con-
cious, one may at least argue that it can be conscious in some
ircumstances, like in motor imagery (Schwoebel & Coslett, 2005).
n motor imagery, one imagines one’s body performing move-
ents. It is now well documented that motor imagery shares many
roperties with physical actions at the physiological level (mus-
le activity), at the kinematic level (similar physical constraints
nd laws) and at the neural level (shared patterns of brain acti-
ation) (Jeannerod, 1997). As such, motor imagery constitutes a
ood task to assess the integrity of the body schema (Schwoebel
Boronat, 2002; Schwoebel & Coslett, 2005). What is interest-
ng is that motor imagery can be conscious or not. For instance,
n hand laterality judgments, participants imagine their own hand
otating so that it matches the visually presented hand (Parsons,
987). Most of the time, mental rotation remains implicit, although
articipants canperform it explicitly and consciouslywithoutmod-
fying their performance (de Vignemont et al., 2006). Another task
o assess the body schema used by Schwoebel and Coslett (2005) is
o explicitly ask patients to imagine performing actions. Again, the
atients are consciously performing the action in their head. They
ave a conscious access to the mental representation of the body
n action, namely, to the body schema. The body schema is then
onscious. That does not mean that the computations involved in
he construction of the body schema (e.g., multisensory integra-
ion) are available to consciousness, but the output, namely, the
epresentation of the body in action can be conscious in some rare
ircumstances like motor imagery. Consequently, the availability
o consciousness is not a criterion to differentiate the body schema
nd the body image.
More important as a deﬁning feature of the body schema is its
ole in the motor hierarchy. The body schema is exploited by the
otor system at different stages. In the computational framework,
he motor system uses two types of internal models: the inverse
odel and the forward model (Wolpert, Ghahramani, & Flanagan,Please cite this article in press as: de Vignemont, F. Body schem
doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2009.09.022
001). They both involve the body schema. The inverse model has
he role of computing the motor commands needed to achieve
he desired state given the agent’s current body state. The inverse
odel is thus fed by the initial body schema, including long-term
nformation like the size of the limbs, and short-term information PRESS
logia xxx (2009) xxx–xxx 5
like the joint angles and the hand position. In parallel, the motor
system anticipates the sensorimotor consequences of the move-
ment through the forwardmodel. The forwardmodel predictswhat
an action will be like given the speciﬁc body that executes the
motor commands. It results in the predicted body schema, which
carries information only about the bodily parameters that will be
altered by the movement like the hand position. It is involved
in motor imagery and allows anticipatory control of movements.
Finally, there is the actual sensory feedback resulting from the exe-
cution of the action that provides the updated body schema, which
again carries information only about the bodily parameters that
have been altered. Consequently, both the predicted body schema
and the updated body schema are dynamic short-term body rep-
resentations, whereas only the initial body schema includes both
short-term and long-term body representations. However, it is
worth noting that during childhood, the child may learn that his
arm is longer than before for instance by overreaching the jam
pot. If so, the discrepancy between the expected arm size and
the actual arm size leads to accordingly modify the initial body
schema.
If indeed the body schema has to explain action program and
guidance, then this is how it should be deﬁned. But does one need
a speciﬁc type of body representation to do that, one that would be
different from the one used in perceptual reports about the body? I
have provided here a theoretical deﬁnition of the body schema. It is
time now to determine whether there is any psychological reality
behind. Let us see whether there is empirical evidence in favour of
the distinction between action-oriented body representations and
the other types of body representation. In order to do so, we shall
have to ﬁrst determinewhat toolswe have to speciﬁcally assess the
body schema by contrast with the body image(s).
3. Pointing to what?
Very few tests have been developed to assess body representa-
tions. The task is made more difﬁcult by the variety of aspects of
body representation that can be evaluated. One may be interested
in the shape and size of the body, in the position of body parts, or
in the localization of bodily sensations. Each feature requires its
own measure. For instance, the experimenter can appeal to visual
matching with body templates for body size, to motor matching
with the contralateral side for the posture, and to pointing to body
parts for the localization of sensations. If one wants furthermore
to dissociate between different types of body representation, then
one needs speciﬁc tools to assess each type. The battery of tests
that has been suggested to assess the body schema versus the body
image(s) is actually limited, as shown in Table 2.
One task that has come back again and again since Head and
Holmes (1911) is that of asking participants to point to a body part
that has been either touched, or named, or visually shown on a
picture. Although it is widely used, especially in neuropsychology,
it is not clear what the pointing task is supposed to assess. On the
one hand, it is taken as a measure of the body schema. As such,
it is said to be impaired in deafferentation, but not in numbsense
(Dijkerman&deHaan, 2007;Gallagher&Cole, 1995; Paillard, 1999;
Rossetti et al., 1995). On the other hand, it is taken as a measure of
the body image. As such, it is said to be impaired in autotopagnosia,
but not in apraxia (Schwoebel & Coslett, 2005; Sirigu et al., 1991).
In addition, sometimes it is a measure of both the visuo-spatial and
the semantic components (Sirigu et al., 1991); sometimes it is a
measure of the visuo-spatial body imageonly (Schwoebel&Coslett,a and body image—Pros and cons. Neuropsychologia (2009),
2005). Finally, it has been recently argued that it is not a measure
of body representation at all, but rather a measure of non-verbal
communication (Cleret de Langavant, Trinkler, Cesaro, & Bachoud-
Lévi, 2009). This latter view, however, is supported by evidence
on pointing to another individual’s body parts. As the situation is
ARTICLE IN PRESSGModelNSY-3425; No.of Pages13
6 F. de Vignemont / Neuropsychologia xxx (2009) xxx–xxx
Table 2
Assessing the distinct types of body representation.
Body schema Body image(s)
Sensorimotor Visuo-spatial Semantic
Paillard (1999)
Anema et al. (2009)
Pointing to one’s body part Naming one’s body part
Pointing to a pictured body part
Semenza and Goodglass
(1985)
Sirigu et al. (1991)
Pointing to one’s body part
Contiguous errors
Pointing to one’s body part
Functional errors
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Motor imagery
lready complex enough without adding someone else’s body, I
hall focusonpointing toone’sownbodyparts. So,whatdopointing
rrorsmean?Adisruption of the body schemaor a disruption of the
ody image(s)?
The reply is that it can reﬂect both types of disorders. There
re indeed two possible uses of most intentional hand movements.
ost of the time, they are mere actions, performed for instance
ecause one wants to do something with a speciﬁc object. When I
cale the distance between thumb and index ﬁnger, it is because I
ant to grasp the object in front ofme. However, in the experimen-
al context, manual responses can also be used to give a perceptual
eport. For instance, I can scale the distance between thumb and
ndex ﬁnger in order to report the size of the seen object. Inter-
stingly, the underlying processes are very different, and patients
ith visual apperceptive agnosia are impaired in one, and not in
he other (Milner & Goodale, 1995). Consequently, it is a mistake
o assume that every manual response is action-oriented. And it is
ossible to dissociate the two uses of the same manual response,
ike in vision (Milner & Goodale, 1995), and like in touch (Anema
t al., 2009).
The duality of use is especially true in the case of pointing
esponse. The fact is that pointing is an unusual action. It is a
ommunicative act that makes sense only in a social context. It
s used to attract an observer’s attention to a target and to indicate
t. The function of the pointing gesture can be either declarative
e.g., infants point to share attention and interest) or imperative
e.g., infants point when they want the observer to bring the tar-
et). Pointing to body parts (rather than pointing to objects) is even
ore special. Pointing to body parts reaches an adult level only
etween 4 and 5 years of age (Poeck & Orgass, 1964), whereas most
ody-directed actions develop earlier. It involves representing the
ody both as the goal of the action and as the effector of the action.
urprisingly, however, what is measured in most studies is only
he ability to localize the bodily goal, and very rarely the ability to
ake fast pointing movements, whether they are directed towards
he body or not. The problem is that if you do not compare the
wo, then you cannot determinewhether the participants have dis-
urbed representation of the body as the goal or of the body as the
ffector.
Pointing gestures have thus an informative value, especially in
linical situations where the patients have to indicate the body part
o the examiner. Here, it seems that pointing is more often used
or perceptual report than for action. This is clearly the case for
nstance when patients are asked to point where they have been
ouched on a pictorial map of their hand (Anema et al., 2009). This
s also the case in studies of autotopagnosia where patients are said
o make errors if they point on their own body to the wrong bodyPlease cite this article in press as: de Vignemont, F. Body schem
doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2009.09.022
art (e.g., arm rather than hand), but not if they point to the wrong
actile locus in the correct bodypart (e.g., on the left side of thepalm
ather than on its right) (e.g., Sirigu et al., 1991). I suggest that in
hese studies, the patients are asked to give categorical judgments
ia a manual report. By contrast, when patients are asked to pointPointing to one’s body part
and to a pictured body
Matching body parts to functions
and body-related objects
on their own hand where exactly they have been touched, it is the
precise spatial location within the hand that is measured (Anema
et al., 2009). Similarly, in studieswith deafferented and numbsense
patients, the errors are spatial errors, rather than categorical errors
(Paillard et al., 1983; Rossetti et al., 1995). It is the exact location on
the palm that is required. This difference between the two types of
studiesmay explain the two distinct interpretations of the pointing
task. Categorical errors on one’s handwould reveal a body image(s)
deﬁcit, whereas spatial errors on one’s hand would reveal a body
schema deﬁcit.
A further and crucial difference between the studies is the
availability of visual feedback. In some studies, patients see their
body (Schwoebel & Coslett, 2005); in others, they are blindfolded
(Paillard et al., 1983; Rossetti et al., 1995). Because in the for-
mer case, pointing movements are visually guided, they cannot be
considered as ballistic. Ideally, a truly ballistic movement should
be entirely accounted for by commands existing before its initi-
ation executed without visual feedback (Jeannerod, 1997). When
patients are not blindfolded, they can use on-line visual informa-
tion about their body to help themanddo not exclusively rely on an
internalized body representation. They also have more time to per-
form the movement. Interestingly, it was shown that patients with
visual deﬁcit in dorsal stream are still able to make fairly accurate
pointingmovements afterbeing instructed to slowdown(Kroliczak
et al., 2006; Rossetti et al., 2005).
Consequently, I would like to suggest that there is no contradic-
tion between the two opposite interpretations of pointing errors
either in terms of a body schema deﬁcit or in terms of a body image
deﬁcit. Depending on the target (e.g., one’s hand versus a hand
map), on the type of errors measured (e.g., spatial versus categor-
ical) and on the type of movements performed (e.g., slow visually
guided informative gesture or fast ballistic movement), pointing
might recruit different types of body representations. Nonethe-
less, it does not seem ideal to use an action to test non-action
related body representations such as the body image(s). Nor is it
certain that one never recruits the body image(s) when perform-
ing even fast ballistic pointing movements. Indeed, if one analyses
what is really required by pointing, one soon realizes that point-
ing always taps both types of body representations: sensorimotor
and visuo-spatial (and sometimes semantic as well). In order to
point to where you have been touched with your right hand, there
are several tasks that the brain needs to perform: (i) localization
of the effector (e.g., where is my right hand?); (ii) identiﬁcation
of the target body part (e.g., what has been touched? the leg?);
(iii) localization of the target body part (e.g., where is my leg rel-
ative to my hand?); (iv) localization of the stimulus site within
the body part (e.g., where on my leg have I been touched?). Ofa and body image—Pros and cons. Neuropsychologia (2009),
course, none of these questions is raised consciously. But this does
not show that one does not implicitly use body representations
to answer them, and most probably these body representations
have different spatial frames of reference, and are of different
types.
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To clearly dissociate the body schema and the body image(s),
newould ideallyneedanexperimentalmeasure that is bothexclu-
ive (i.e. speciﬁc to one kind of body representation only) and
xhaustive (i.e. representative of the whole body representation,
nd not only of part of it). However, the few methods that are used
ike the pointing task are neither exclusive nor exhaustive. Part
f the answer might be to use reaching and grasping movements
or testing impairments of the body schema rather than pointing
ovements (see Merleau-Ponty (1945) for an early account of the
ifference; seealsoCleretdeLangavantet al., 2009 for adissociation
etween pointing and grasping in patients with heterotopagnosia).
ypically, one reaches a body part to do something on it (e.g., to
ut a hat on, to scratch a mosquito bite, etc.), such movements are
most of the time) a mere step in a series of actions performed
owards the body part. As such, reaching and grasping movements
re more directly linked to the body schema. We shall see now
ow the lack of proper tools affects the interpretations of bodily
isorders.
. Neuropsychological dissociations
Most of the literature on body representation heavily relies on
europsychological dissociations. However, a ﬁrst thing one should
ote is that the neuropsychological dissociations exploited by cur-
ent theories that posit multiple body representations are just a
ew among a long list of possible dissociations. Their taxonomies
ssume the existence of two or three types of body representa-
ion only, whereas they have to explain more than thirty kinds
f bodily disorders, which are not easily classiﬁed, or at least not
long the dyadic or triadic taxonomy. One may argue that the
mpairment of one and the same type of body representation can
ead to different syndromes. However, if a putative disruption of
he body image can lead to phenomena as diverse as Cotard syn-
rome (i.e. you believe your body is dead and rotting) and ﬁnger
gnosia (i.e. you cannot name your ﬁngers), then there is a risk
f making the concept of a body image empty of meaning and
xplanatory power. There is an alternative that consists in assum-
ng that each bodily disorder involves the breakdown of a different
ype of body representation. However, there are so many bodily
isorders, and therefore so many possible dissociations, that one
ould end up with an almost inﬁnite list of body representations.
ushed to its limits, thedissociativeprinciplewouldno longermake
ense.
One might agree that the neuropsychological taxonomies fail to
rovide an exhaustive account of all bodily disorders and still hold
hat the limited account is plausible. For it does not follow that
he account provided of the limited number of pathologies directly
argeted is false. One may further argue that those disorders arePlease cite this article in press as: de Vignemont, F. Body schem
doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2009.09.022
ctually the clearest cases, and as such, offer a good grasp of what
an be impaired in bodily disorders in general. The problem with
his lineof reasoning is that even those limitedcasesarenot soclear,
s shown by the completely opposite ways they are explained (see
able 3). Here, I shall highlight the complexity of most syndromes,
able 3
europsychological dissociations between multiple body representations.
Body schema Body ima
Sensorimotor Visuo-spa
Deafferentation (Paillard, 1999; Gallagher, 2005)
Personal neglect (Coslett, 1998)
Apraxia (Buxbaum et al., 2000; Schwoebel & Coslett, 2005)
Autotopa
Schwoeb PRESS
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such complexity often resulting from simultaneous deﬁcits of the
body schema and the body image(s). I shall conclude with a double
dissociation that seems to be themost promising in the perspective
of dissociating the body schema and the body image(s).
4.1. Peripheral deafferentation: the “missing body schema”
(Gallagher, 2005)?
Following very rare acute sensory neuropathy, some patients
become deafferented below the neck, i.e., they have no propriocep-
tive function and no sense of touch. Their motor system is spared
and they are capable of movements. In addition, they experience
hot, cold, and pain and retain their vestibular sense of balance. Yet,
they have no inner sense of bodily posture. If they close their eyes,
they do not know where their limbs are. Consequently, they have
to learn to exploit visual information in order to know where their
limbs are so that they can guide their movements. According to
Gallagher and Cole (1995), major parts of their body schema are
“missing”, and compensated by a reﬂexive use of their body image.
But in what sense is the body schema defective? After all, they
canmove. Youmay not even be able to notice that there is anything
abnormal when you meet them. As noticed by Travieso, Pilar, and
Gomila (2007, p. 223): “What we think the results show is that
G.L. [a deafferented patient] was simply poor at pointing without
vision: she was equally good at pointing with vision towards her
hand or towards a picture. Her problem was not with action itself,
but with the use of haptic information alone (without vision).”
It does not make more sense to claim that deafferented patients
have a deﬁcit of body schema than to claim that blind people have
a deﬁcit of body schema. In the latter case, they rely on proprio-
ception instead of vision. In the former case, they rely on vision
instead of proprioception. The body schema (qua sensorimotor
representation) is there, although based on different weighting
of information. Whereas proprioception may normally play an
important role, it has been taken over by vision in deafferented
patients.
One may reply that their actions are not normal because they
require reﬂexive monitoring of their movements. This might have
been true at the beginning when the patients had to learn how to
visually guide their movements. Similarly, you have to pay atten-
tion at thebeginningwhenyou learn todrive a car. But after awhile,
you drive without consciously monitoring the visual information
that you receive on the other cars, the road, etc. Deafferented
patients are like the automatic drivers. Their actions have become
automatic routines that do not prevent them of simultaneously
doing other activities like talking. This is not to say that their body
schema has not changed. It has, giving more weight to vision. But
it is not “missing”.a and body image—Pros and cons. Neuropsychologia (2009),
4.2. Apraxia: conceptual or sensorimotor deﬁcit?
A better candidate for a deﬁcit of body schema may be apraxia
(Buxbaum, Giovannetti, & Libon, 2000; Schwoebel & Coslett, 2005).
ge(s)
tial Semantic
Numbsense (Paillard, 1999)
Personal neglect (Gallagher, 2005)
Apraxia (Goldenberg, 1995)
gnosia (Sirigu et al., 1991;
el & Coslett, 2005)
Autotopagnosia (Sirigu et
al., 1991)
Body-speciﬁc aphasia
(Schwoebel & Coslett,
2005)
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t is generally deﬁned as a disorder of skilled movements that
annot be explained by peripheral deﬁcits (e.g., motor weakness,
eafferentation, etc.). However, there may be as much as 29 differ-
nt kinds of apraxia (for a full review, see Petreska, Adriani, Blanke,
Billard, 2007). Theycanbe lesion-speciﬁc,modality-speciﬁc, task-
peciﬁc, and effector-speciﬁc. They can be grouped into two main
ypes. Ideational apraxia results from disturbance in the concep-
ual organization of actions. Ideomotor apraxia is considered to be
disorder of the production of sensorimotor programs. I shall focus
n this latter type.
Most theoretical models explain ideomotor apraxia in terms
f central motor deﬁcits. There is, however, some evidence in
avour of a bodily deﬁcit. In clinical examination, it is often
eported that patients with ideomotor apraxia mislocate the
oal of their reﬂective actions (e.g., brushing chin rather than
eeth). These patients demonstrate even greater deﬁcits in locat-
ng the hand that will carry the action (Haaland, Harrington,
Knight, 1999). In addition, they have difﬁculties in imitat-
ng meaningful and meaningless gestures (Buxbaum et al., 2000;
oldenberg, 1995). Both types of imitation require the match-
ng of someone else’s body onto one’s own body (“the body
orrespondence problem” Goldenberg, 1995). Meaningless ges-
ures are of particular interest because they rely exclusively on
he encoding of the bodily attributes of the movements (i.e.
ncoding the position of one’s own body, abstracting the target
osition from individual differences, and matching one’s position
nto the other’s position). There is no stored gesture information
o confer a processing advantage in on-line meaningless imita-
ion.
But at what stage are apraxic patients impaired? At the stage of
he evaluation of the position their own body? At the stage of the
valuation of the target bodily conﬁguration? And/or at the stage of
he ability to map their own body with the target body? And what
ype(s) of body representation is impaired? The sensorimotor level
r the conceptual level? According to Goldenberg (1995), ideomo-
or apraxia is due to a deﬁcit of the general conceptual knowledge
f the human body, which sounds like a body image. By contrast,
uxbaum et al. (2000) argue that ideomotor apraxia results from a
eﬁcit of the body schema.
It is especially hard to settle the debate as the experimental
esults are sometimes contradictory. First, itwas found that apraxic
atients are impaired on aiming movements without visual feed-
ack (Haaland et al., 1999; Ietswaart, Carey, & Della Sala, 2006).
urthermore, they are impaired in some motor imagery tasks (i.e.
ental rotation and imagining movements, cf. Buxbaum et al.,
000; Sirigu et al., 1996). However, they are not impaired in all
otor imagery tasks (i.e. reporting the side on which the lit-
le ﬁnger appears from the patient’s perspective when asked to
magine her hand in a particular position, cf. Sirigu et al., 1996).
nd spontaneous behavior is said to be relatively preserved in
praxia, although clumsy or awkward. In addition, Goldenberg
1995) found that apraxic patients have difﬁculties not only in
mitating postures with their own body, but also in matching
he position of the body parts of a life-sized manikin with the
arget bodily posture. This deﬁcit seems to go beyond the con-
equences of an impairment of the body schema. Goldenberg
rgues that imitation requires abstracting from differences in spa-
ial positions as well as from differences in the size and shape of
he bodies. Consequently, it seems to rely upon general knowl-
dge of the body, which applies also to manikins. We are far
rom the primary sensorimotor body schema guiding one’s ownPlease cite this article in press as: de Vignemont, F. Body schem
doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2009.09.022
ovements.
To conclude, there are convincing hints that a disruption of the
ody schema contributes to ideomotor apraxia, but most probably
t is only partial. It certainly does not exclude the possibility of a
oncomitant disorder of the body image. PRESS
logia xxx (2009) xxx–xxx
4.3. Personal neglect: lack of attention towards the body image or
the body schema?
The situation is even less clear for personal neglect. Personal
neglect is clinically deﬁned by a lack of exploration of half of
the body contralateral to the damaged hemisphere. Yet, neglect
patients do not complain about the missing half of their body.
They feel as they always felt, as if their body were complete. Again,
there are contradictory interpretations of this bodily disorder. It
is conceived either as a deﬁcit of the body image with a preserved
body schema (Gallagher, 2005), or as a deﬁcit of the body schema
with a preserved body image (Coslett, 1998).
It is interesting to note that the way to assess personal neglect
is by using exploratory actions like combing or shaving (McIntosh,
Brodie, Beschin, & Robertson, 2000). It was also found that some
patients with personal neglect were impaired in mental rotation
for laterality judgments (Coslett, 1998). One may conclude that the
representation of the left side of the body for action, namely, the
body schema, ismissing.What about the body image? The only rea-
son why one would claim that the body image is impaired is that
there is a lack of awareness of the left side of the body (Gallagher,
2005). This conclusion requires deﬁning the body image in terms of
consciousness. The argument would run as follows: the conscious
body percept is missing, therefore, the body image must be miss-
ing. But one may easily imagine that patients with personal neglect
have still their body percept, although they cannot have a con-
scious access to it. As far as extrapersonal neglect is concerned, it
was shown that a patient was able to make judgments on burn-
ing houses presented in his left hemispace (Marshall & Halligan,
1988). Hence, he could make perceptual reports, although he was
not conscious of the house. In this sense, his perceptual processing
was preserved. As far as I know, there is no equivalent study for
patients with personal neglect. However, on the basis of the ﬁnd-
ings on extrapersonal neglect, one may expect that patients with
personal neglect will display the same type of performance and
they will be able to make unconscious perceptual judgments about
the left side of their body, although they are not aware of it. This
would show a preserved perceptual body image. The body image,
indeed, does not always need to reach the level of awareness.
Most probably, personal neglect is ﬁrst an attentional deﬁcit,
beforebeinga representationaldeﬁcit (Kinsbourne, 1995).Onemay
indeed notice that it is never a single body part that is neglected,
as one would expect if it were a representational deﬁcit. Similarly,
there isno focalneglect in thevisualﬁeld. Instead, it is the left sideof
the body that is neglected, especially its more extreme lateral parts
(i.e. hands and feet). This could be explained by an attentional shift
generated by a rightward bias, which can be reversed by vestibu-
lar stimulation (Cappa, Sterzi, Vallar, & Bisiach, 1987). From this
point of view there is no need to postulate personal neglect as a
deﬁcit of body representation, i.e., neither a body image nor a body
schema deﬁcit. Rather it is a deﬁcit of directing attention to the
body. However, this attentional deﬁcit must have consequences
on body representations, on both the body schema and the body
image. That it affects motor imagery is thus not surprising, espe-
cially since similar attentional effects have been shown in visual
imagery too (Rode, Rossetti, Li, & Boisson, 1998). Surely it must
have further consequences, still to be empirically investigated.
4.4. Autotopagnosia: semantic deﬁcit, visuo-spatial deﬁcit, or
both?a and body image—Pros and cons. Neuropsychologia (2009),
Some patients are unable to localize body parts. Sometimes
it affects localization on both one’s own body and other people’s
body (and even pictorial body representations), sometimes only
one’s own body, and sometimes only someone else’s body (Cleret
de Langavant et al., 2009; Felician et al., 2003). Here I shall restrict
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yself to the inability to localize one’s own body parts, namely,
utotopagnosia. The good news is that there is some consensus
hat it results from a deﬁcit of body image(s), although there is a
ittle disagreement concerning the aspect of the body image that is
ffected, the visuo-spatial component (Schwoebel & Coslett, 2005)
r the semantic component, or both (Sirigu et al., 1991). Patients
ith autotopagnosia have difﬁculties in constructing an image
f a body with tiles. Although her performance was very poor,
orresponding to that of a 4–6-year-old child, a patient reported
eing happy with the result, demonstrating she was unable to
udge the oddity of her work (Guariglia, Piccardi, Puglisi Allegra,
Traballesi, 2002). In addition (except when autotopagnosia is
ssociated with apraxia) patients are able to use the body parts
hat they cannot localize.
Yet, the diagnosis may not be so clear-cut. If the body image
orresponds to the way we perceive our body and underlies our
onscious body judgments, how is it possible that its impairment
emained unnoticed? Patients with autotopagnosia are indeed not
isturbed by their syndrome in their everyday life. They are not
ven aware that anything goes wrong. Furthermore, the most stan-
ardwayof testingautotopagnosia is by showing thatpatientshave
ifﬁculties to point to body parts. This is taken by Schwoebel and
oslett (2005) as an argument for a deﬁcit of body image(s). Yet, as
e have seen, pointing also potentially recruits the body schema,
lthough less in the type of slow visually guided informative point-
ng used in the autotopagnosia studies. It would be interesting to
lso measure the spatial errors in blindfolded fast ballistic pointing
ovements.
.5. Numbsense and co: dissociation between action and touch
Following cortical or subcortical lesions, patients with numb-
ense become completely anaesthetized on their right side. The
actile deﬁcit can be so severe that the patient may cut or burn her-
elfwithoutnoticing it. Even inverbal forced-choice condition, they
annot detect and they can neither verbally nor manually localize
actile stimuli (on a pictorial representation of the body). Yet, they
anpoint towhere theyhave been touchedwith their unstimulated
and, and to their own surprise (Paillard et al., 1983; Rossetti et al.,
995). In this sense, numbsense can be compared to what has been
alled action-blindsight (i.e. patients able to accurately act upon
lind ﬁeld stimuli by pointing or saccading towards them, although
hey cannot make visual judgments in a forced-choice condition)
Danckert & Rossetti, 2005). Interestingly, when numbsense
atients were asked both at the same time to verbally localize and
o point to where they had been touched, they became equally
ad. Their bodily movements did not improve their performance
n verbal localization. In addition, one patient with numbsense,
A, was unaware of his arm location. When his arm was passively
oved while blindfolded, he could not verbally localize it. Yet, he
as able to point accurately to the position of his arm (Rossetti et
l., 1995). It thus seems that we have here a clear case of deﬁcit of
ody image (impaired bodily judgments), with a preserved body
chema (preserved body-oriented actions) (Paillard, 1999).
However, the dissociation between preserved actions and
mpaired detection judgments (conscious or not) shown in these
atients has been recently challenged on methodological ground
Harris, Karlov, & Clifford, 2006). Brieﬂy, patients were asked a
yes-no” judgment of detection. They thus had to adopt a decision
riterion (i.e. when to say yes or no). In contrast, localization did
ot require adopting such decision criterion, and thus was morePlease cite this article in press as: de Vignemont, F. Body schem
doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2009.09.022
ensitive to whatever weak sensory signal was present to guide
heir movements. Harris and colleagues showed with healthy par-
icipants that if detection and localization were measured with
quivalent forced-choice tasks, the subjectswere unable to point to
he tactile stimuli that they hadnot detected. The authors speculate PRESS
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that the dissociation between action and touch would disappear if
this study were done with numbsense patients.
Yet, a recent study found a double dissociation between action
and touch in localization tasks with identical decision criterion
(Anema et al., 2009). Unlike numbsense patients, the patient JO
can detect tactile stimulation on her right hand, although her
sensitivity is decreased. She has no proprioceptive deﬁcit. She
was tested in four conditions. She was asked (i) to point with the
unstimulated hand to the stimulated hand where she had been
touched, (ii) to point with the unstimulated hand to a map of the
stimulated hand, (iii) to point to neutral visual targets to control
for perceptual and motor deﬁcits, and (iv) to return her arm to
the previously held position after it had been moved passively to a
different location. It was found that she failed to point accurately
to the hand map, whereas she did not fail to point to her own
hand. Her difﬁculties with the hand map could not be explained
in terms of visual or proprioceptive deﬁcit, as she performed
correctly in the two control tasks (iii) and (iv). Interestingly, the
reverse dissociation was found in another patient, KE. Like JO,
KE has preserved but decreased tactile sensitivity. Proprioceptive
perception is damaged, but only partially and KE’s performance in
the proprioceptive task was similar to JO’s performance. Using the
same experimental paradigm as for JO, it was found that he failed
to point accurately to his own hand, but not to the hand map. The
double dissociation between JO and KE might be considered as the
most convincing case for the distinction between body schema
and the visuo-spatial aspect of the body image(s).
We have seen the difﬁculty in ﬁnding neuropsychological evi-
dence for the functional distinctionbetweenbody schemaandbody
image(s). For somesyndromes, there isnoneed topostulateadeﬁcit
of a speciﬁc body representation. They can be explained by exter-
nal factors such as sensory or attentional deﬁcits. Other syndromes,
likeapraxia andautotopagnosia, arequiteplausiblydue to impaired
body representations. But how speciﬁc are the deﬁcits? It seems
that it is only in the case of the patients JO and KE that we even-
tually ﬁnd a clear dissociation between the body schema and the
body image(s). Unfortunately, we do not have much information
about their lesions and their deﬁcits. In addition, they must have
at least a preserved sensorimotor representation of their pointing
hand, which always successfully reaches the target in one of the
two conditions (i.e. hand versus hand map). Let us see now if the
dissociations are clearer in healthy individuals.
5. Dissociations in healthy participants
There may be more hope in validating the distinction between
the body schema and the body image(s) in healthy individuals.
However, very few studies have tried to dissociate the two types
of body representation outside of neuropsychology (de Vignemont,
Majid, Jola, & Haggard, 2009; Kammers, van der Ham, & Dijkerman,
2006; Kammers, de Vignemont, Verhagen, & Dijkerman, 2009;
Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005). We have seen that one way of validat-
ing the Perception–Action model in vision is to show that action
is not sensitive to some visual illusions like the Titchener’s illusion
(Aglioti, DeSouza, & Goodale, 1995). On the basis of such ﬁndings,
although still controversial, one should expect the body schema
to be immune to some bodily illusions such as the now classical
Rubber Hand Illusion (RHI).
In the RHI paradigm, participants sit with their left arm rest-
ing on a table, hidden behind a screen. They are asked to visually
ﬁxate a rubber hand presented in front of them, and (with twoa and body image—Pros and cons. Neuropsychologia (2009),
paintbrushes) the experimenter simultaneously strokes both the
participant’s hand and the fake hand. After a shortwhile, themajor-
ity of participants report that they feel the touch of the paintbrush
in the location where they see the rubber hand touched. Even more
surprisingly, they may feel as if the rubber hand were their own
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and (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998). At the behavioral level, partici-
ants report their hand to be closer to the rubber hand than it really
s. This is true only when the two hands are synchronously stimu-
ated. In other words, vision ‘captures’ tactile sensations, and this
ultimodal match leads to proprioceptive drift.
The interest of the RHI is that it does not result solely fromapure
emporal matching between visual and tactile information. Body
epresentations also seem to play an important role (Costantini &
aggard, 2007; Tsakiris &Haggard, 2005). For instance, the effect of
he illusion is reducedwhen the posture or the laterality of the rub-
er hand is incongruent with the unseen real hand. Consequently,
he illusion should depend on the type of body representation that
s recruited by the experiment. Most versions of the RHI mainly
nvolve the body image, both because of the input (i.e. passive tac-
ile stimulation) and because of the task (i.e. introspective report
nd perceptual judgment of the hand location). However, the body
chema/body image(s) taxonomy predicts a dissociation between
he subjective experience of the hand position and changes in sen-
orimotor coordination.
In Kammers, de Vignemont et al. (2009), after stroking the index
nger (synchronously or asynchronously), we asked participants,
ho could no longer see the rubber hand nor their own hands, to
ndicate the felt position of their unseen stimulated hand by pro-
iding both verbal responses and motor responses. Several types
f motor responses were used: (i) reaching the unseen stimu-
ated hand with the contralateral hand (i.e. stimulated hand as
he goal), (ii) reaching the contralateral hand with the unseen
timulated hand (i.e. stimulated hand as the effector), and (iii)
rasping a stick with the two hands (i.e. object-directed action).
e recorded the kinematics of all the motor responses. We found
proprioceptive drift for the perceptual response, but no pro-
rioceptive drift for any of the motor responses. The kinematics
f reaching movements towards the stimulated hand with the
on-stimulated handwas similar after asynchronous and after syn-
hronous stroking. The same was found for reaching movements
owards thenon-stimulatedhandwith the stimulatedhand, aswell
s for grasping movements. In other words, the representations of
he body both as the goal and as the effector were immune to the
llusion.
Even more convincing, and maybe more surprising, is the
ndependence of the perceptual and motor responses. When par-
icipants were asked a second time to give a perceptual judgment
fter havingmoved, theywere still sensitive to theRHI. Visual infor-
ation about the rubber hand location, which was available only
uring the stroking phase, remarkably kept on dominating despite
he proprioceptive update following the movements of the stim-
lated hand. The dissociation between the two types of tasks is
uch that the RHI is maintained even after the motor response,
hich revealed an accurate sense of the position of the stimulated
and.
The results reveal a dissociation, but a dissociation between
hat? The verbal response most likely involves the body image(s).
he question is whether the motor responses used in this study are
ction-oriented. Interestingly, in the original RHI study, Botvinick
nd Cohen (1998) asked participants to point where they felt their
troked hand was and they did ﬁnd a proprioceptive drift. How-
ver, as acknowledged by the authors, the movements were not
allistic (Botvinick, personal communication). Although the partic-
pants did not receive visual feedback, they were allowed to make
djustments and to perform them slowly. By contrast, here we
sed reaching movements. As argued before, we believe them toPlease cite this article in press as: de Vignemont, F. Body schem
doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2009.09.022
e less ambiguous than pointing movements. The purely motoric
unction of the motor responses is even more convincing in the
ase of stick grasping. In all cases, participants made fast ballistic
ovements with no visual feedback. The results thus show that
ction-oriented responses do not follow the same rules as non- PRESS
logia xxx (2009) xxx–xxx
action-oriented responses in the sense that they are immune to
the RHI. Participants knew how to get to their hand, but not where
their handwas, evenafter havingmoved it. Onemay interpret these
ﬁndings in terms of a dissociation between the body schema and
the body image(s).
However, for the purpose of understanding the varieties of pro-
cessing of bodily information, the distinction between perception
and action is an unacceptable oversimpliﬁcation, as shown by a
further RHI study by Kammers, Kootker, Hogendoorn, & Dijkerman
(submitted for publication). The hands (the participant’s hand and
the rubber hand) were shaped as if they were ready to grasp an
object, with congruent or incongruent width of grip aperture. The
index ﬁngers and thumbs of both hands were stroked. After the
stroking phase, participants were asked to grasp an object. It was
found that the seen rubber grip aperture inﬂuenced the partici-
pant’s maximum grip aperture during the grasping trajectory after
synchronous stimulation only. It shows that some action-oriented
motor response can be affected by bodily illusions. This result is
in line with the well-known dissociation between visually guided
movements of reaching and grasping (Jeannerod, 1997). Reach-
ing and grasping components of prehension reﬂect the output
of two independent, though temporally coupled, motor programs
(Jakobson & Goodale, 1991; Roy, Paulignan, Meunier, & Boussaoud,
2006). For instance, a patientwith bilateral posterior parietal lesion
showed a deﬁcit in grasping objects, with no deﬁcit in reaching
them (Jeannerod, 1997).
Do these new results challenge the previous ones by Kammers,
de Vignemont et al. (2009)? No. It is true that action is affected
by the rubber hand in this study, and not in the former. How-
ever, it was the hand trajectory that what was recorded in the
former, and the maximum grip aperture in the latter. Yet, it
remains that some aspects of action calibration can be sensitive
to the RHI, in the same way that they were found to be sen-
sitive to visual illusions in some contexts (Franz, Gegenfurtner,
Bulthoff, & Fahle, 2000; Smeets, Brenner, de Grave, & Cuijpers,
2002). There seems to be no longer a difference with non-action-
oriented responses. Should we then give up on the distinction
between body schema and body image(s) if the evidence is so dim
and limited? I would like to suggest here that these last results
about grip aperture are more an invitation to reﬁne our model
than a decisive objection. They do not show that there is only
one type of body representation. What they really challenge is the
hypothesis that the two types of body representation work inde-
pendently in complete isolation in healthy individuals. But nobody
is ready to defend such an extreme view. Most likely, the body
schema and the body image(s) interact all the time. This is what
we have already seen with neuropsychological disorders, which
almost never affect only one type of body representation. This
interaction is also what could explain the effect of the RHI on
grip aperture. Hence, it is necessary to move beyond an absolute
dichotomy between perception and action and to investigate when
and how the body schema and the body image(s) work hand in
hand. In order to do so, one needs more experimental evidence,
but also a computational model of how body representations are
built up.
6. Building up body representations
The neuropsychological taxonomies on body representations
focusprimarilyon theﬁnaloutputofbodily informationprocessing,
neglecting prior computational stages. They offer no explanation ofa and body image—Pros and cons. Neuropsychologia (2009),
the principles governing the construction of body representations.
We might be able to shed a new light on the distinction between
body schema and body image(s) by investigating how they are built
up at the computational level (Kammers, Mulder, de Vignemont, &
Dijkerman, 2009).
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We continuously receive a ﬂow of sensory information about
ur own body, from various sources. All these different sources of
nformation interact with each other to build up body representa-
ions. They can interact in two different ways. We must distinguish
etween sensory combination and sensory integration, which both
articipate in body representations formation (Ernst & Bülthoff,
004). Sensory combination describes interactions (e.g., cooper-
tion and disambiguation) between sensory signals that are not
edundant. By contrast, sensory integration describes interactions
etween redundant signals. To be integrated, the sensory estimates
ust be in the same units, the same frames of reference and about
he same aspect of the body. They can then be efﬁciently merged
o form a coherent and robust body representation.
There are thus three main obstacles to overcome. First, the rele-
ant elements to integrate as a single bodyperceptmust be selected
nd segregated from those belonging to other bodies or objects.
here is always the risk indeed that one integrates signals from
ne’s own body with signals from someone else’s body, or even
rom a rubber hand. How to guarantee that the different channels
f sensory information come from a common source? The second
roblem is a Tower of Babel type of problem. Each sensory modal-
ty is encoded in its own spatial frame of reference. Consequently,
he brain cannot just combine and average the converging sen-
ory inputs. More elaborate computations are required. How to go
eyond thedifferences between sensory formats and spatial frames
f reference? The thirdproblem is that all the sensory inputs are not
qually trustworthy, and their respective reliability varies widely
ccording to the context and the type of information. How to tem-
er the importance of each modality given the context? This latter
uestion is at the core of Bayesian models, which provide a set of
ules to optimally combine sensory inputs with varying reliabili-
ies (for review, see Mamassian, Landy, & Maloney, 2003; Pouget,
eneve, & Duhamel, 2002).
A Bayesian model starts with some a priori knowledge about
owa systemshouldwork givenbiological and environmental con-
traints. It is represented by a prior probability distribution for a
odel’s structure and parameters—what the variables are and how
hey inﬂuence each other. For example, it represents the relative
lausibility of different locations of the hand. It aims at comput-
ng the posterior probability, that is, the degree of belief in the
rior hypothesis conditioned on the observation of sensory evi-
ence. The posterior probability is proportional to the product of
he prior probability and the likelihood function. The likelihood
s the probability of the data given the hypothesis. It represents
verything one knows about the process that turns the state of
he world into sensory information. Once the posterior probabil-
ty computed, the system has an estimate of the hand position for
nstance. The decisionmade by the system about the hand location,
hether it results in a motor act or a judgment, however, requires
urther computations using gain and loss functions. For every deci-
ion, there are consequences that depend upon the true location
f the hand, consequences that can be positive or negative. The
ayes decision rule aims at maximizing the expected gain given
he posterior probability.
What is interesting with Bayesian models is that they provide
model of understanding of how the functional role can affect the
ontent of body representations. Bayesian models show that the
ormation of body representations is task-dependent. The respec-
ive weight of the inputs varies relatively to the variability of the
ues and the variability of each cue depends on the context. Not
nly the weight given to the sensory signals can vary, but alsoPlease cite this article in press as: de Vignemont, F. Body schem
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he decision-making rules with different gain and loss functions,
nd this again depends on the task. One may thus speculate that
hether the task is action-orientated or not, it appeals to different
rior knowledge leading to different weighting of information. In
ddition, one may speculate that the consequences of the decision PRESS
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for a motor task might differ from those for a perceptual task. For
instance, itwould bemore important to bemore accurate for action
than for perception. If so, the decision criteria would differ and this
would lead to twodistinct types of body representations, those that
are action-oriented and those that are not.
7. Conclusion
What is the functional organization of the representation of
the body? I have analysed here the distinction between the body
schema and the body image, a distinction that owes much to the
Perception–Action model of vision. And like the dual model of
vision, the distinction between two functionally deﬁned types of
body representation is controversial. Deﬁcits of body schema and
deﬁcits of body image(s) are often intermingled within the same
syndrome and hard to take apart, except in few cases. The lack of
clear dissociation in these syndromes should encourage us to clar-
ify the notions of the different types of body representations and
to emphasize the interaction between them. Even the notion of the
body schema, unto which there seems to be a more widespread
agreement, is victim of conceptual confusion. But if one analyses
what is required by action guidance, then one can offer a clear deﬁ-
nition. I proposed here that the body schema is better conceived as
a cluster of sensorimotor representations that are action-oriented.
It represents the body both as the effector and as the goal of the
action, including short-term and long-term bodily properties that
are relevant for action programming, action prediction and sen-
sory feedback. In addition, sometimes, but not always, the body
schema obeys principles that are different from those that apply to
non-action-oriented body representations, like in the RHI.
Because these representations serve different purposes, they
have different contents. The way we use bodily information deter-
mines the way the brain encodes it. Interestingly, this principle is
at the core of the prominent Bayesian approach, which has been
applied to a broad spectrum of cognitive abilities, including multi-
modal integration. By studying how tactile, proprioceptive, visual,
and vestibular sources of information are integrated, one may be
able to understand how the brain represents the body and how it
represents it in a different way depending on its functional role. I
suggest here that the Bayesian framework offers a useful dynamic
model of body representations and of their task-speciﬁcity. How-
ever, one should not confuse the Bayesian approach with a purely
bottom-up approach based solely on raw sensory data. On the
contrary, the Bayesian models highlight the importance of what
they call prior knowledge, which puts higher-level constraints on
multisensory integration. Much remains to be investigated about
the psychological nature and content of bodily prior knowledge.
Yet, the Bayesian approach allows going beyond the dichotomy
between bottom-up and top-down approaches by integrating the
two.
Acknowledgements
I am extremely grateful to Glenn Carruthers, Alessandro Farnè,
Marjolein Kammers, Tomasz Komendzinski, and Adrian Smith for
their friendly support and valuable comments. This work was sup-
ported by the ANR grant no. JCJC06 133960.
References
Aglioti, S., DeSouza, J. F., & Goodale, M. A. (1995). Size-contrast illusions deceive thea and body image—Pros and cons. Neuropsychologia (2009),
eye but not the hand. Current Biology, 5, 679–685.
Anema, H. A., van Zandvoort, M. J., de Haan, E. H., Kappelle, L. J., de Kort, P. L., Jansen,
B. P., et al. (2009). A double dissociation between somatosensory processing for
perception and action. Neuropsychologia, 47, 1615–1620.
Belin, P., & Zatorre, R. J. (2000). ‘What’, ‘where’ and ‘how’ in auditory cortex. Nature
Neuroscience, 3, 965–966.
 INGN
1 sycho
B
B
B
B
C
C
C
C
C
C
D
D
d
d
d
D
E
F
F
G
G
G
G
G
G
G
G
H
H
H
H
H
I
J
J
J
K
KARTICLEModelSY-3425; No.of Pages13
2 F. de Vignemont / Neurop
lock, N. (2007). Consciousness, accessibility and themesh between psychology and
neuroscience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 30, 481–548.
onnier, P. (1905). L’Aschématie [Aschematia]. Revue Neurologique (Paris), 13,
605–609.
otvinick,M., & Cohen, J. (1998). Rubber hands ‘feel’ touch that eyes see. Nature, 391,
756.
uxbaum, L. J., Giovannetti, T., & Libon, D. (2000). The role of the dynamic body
schema in praxis: Evidence from primary progressive apraxia. Brain and Cogni-
tion, 44, 166–191.
appa, S., Sterzi, R., Vallar, G., & Bisiach, E. (1987). Remission of hemineglect and
anosognosia during vestibular stimulation. Neuropsychologia, 25, 775–782.
arruthers, G. (2008). Types of body representation and the sense of embodiment.
Consciousness and Cognition, 17(4), 1302–1316.
leret de Langavant, L., Trinkler, I., Cesaro, P., & Bachoud-Lévi, A. C. (2009). Het-
erotopagnosia: When I point at parts of your body. Neuropsychologia, 47(7),
1745–1755.
ole, J., & Paillard, J. (1995). Living without touch and peripheral information
about body position and movement: Studies with deafferented subjects. In J.
L. Bermudez, A. Marcel, & N. Eilan (Eds.), The body and the self. Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press.
oslett, H. B. (1998). Evidence for a disturbance of the body schema in neglect. Brain
and Cognition, 37, 527–544.
ostantini, M., & Haggard, P. (2007). The rubber hand illusion: Sensitivity
and reference frame for body ownership. Consciousness and Cognition, 16,
229–240.
anckert, J., & Rossetti, Y. (2005). Blindsight in action: What can the different
sub-types of blindsight tell us about the control of visually guided actions?
Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 29(7), 1035–1046.
enes, G. (1990). Disorders of body awareness and body knowledge. In F. Boller, &
J. Grafman (Eds.), Handbook of neuropsychology (pp. 207–228). Elsevier.
e Vignemont, F. (submitted for publication). A mosquito bite against the enactive
approach of bodily experiences.
e Vignemont, F., Majid, A., Jola, C., & Haggard, P. (2009). Segmenting the body into
parts: Evidence from biases in tactile perception. Quarterly Journal of Experimen-
tal Psychology (Colchester), 62, 500–512.
e Vignemont, F., Zalla, T., Posada, A., Louvegnez, A., Koenig, O., Georgieff, N., et
al. (2006). Mental rotation in schizophrenia. Consciousness and Cognition, 15,
295–309.
ijkerman, H. C., & de Haan, E. H. (2007). Somatosensory processes subserving per-
ception and action. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 30, 189–201.
rnst,M. O., & Bülthoff, H. H. (2004).Merging the senses into a robust percept. Trends
in Cognitive Science, 8(4), 162–169.
elician, O., Ceccaldi, M., Didic, M., Thinus-Blanc, C., & Poncet, M. (2003). Pointing to
body parts: A double dissociation study. Neuropsychologia, 41, 1307–1316.
ranz, V. H., Gegenfurtner, K. R., Bulthoff, H. H., & Fahle, M. (2000). Grasping visual
illusions: No evidence for a dissociation between perception and action. Psycho-
logical Science, 11, 20–25.
allagher, S. (1986). Body imageandbodyschema:Aconceptual clariﬁcation. Journal
of Mind and Behavior, 7, 541–554.
allagher, S. (1995). Body schema and intentionality. In J. L. Bermudez, A. Marcel, &
N. Eilan (Eds.), The body and the self. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
allagher, S. (2005). How the body shapes the mind. New York: Oxford University
Press.
allagher, S.,&Cole, J. (1995). Bodyschemaandbody image inadeafferentedsubject.
Journal of Mind and Behaviour, 16, 369–390.
oldenberg, G. (1995). Imitating gestures and manipulating a mannikin—the repre-
sentation of the human body in ideomotor apraxia. Neuropsychologia, 33, 63–72.
oodale, M. A., & Milner, A. D. (1992). Separate visual pathways for perception and
action. Trends in Neurosciences, 15, 20–25.
uariglia, C., Piccardi, L., Puglisi Allegra, M. C., & Traballesi, M. (2002). Is autotopoag-
nosia real? EC says yes. A case study. Neuropsychologia, 40, 1744–1749.
urwitsch, A. (1985). Marginal consciousness. Athens: Ohio University Press.
aaland, K. Y., Harrington, D. L., & Knight, R. T. (1999). Spatial deﬁcits in ideomotor
limb apraxia. A kinematic analysis of aimingmovements. Brain, 122, 1169–1182.
arris, J. A., Karlov, L., & Clifford, C. W. (2006). Localization of tactile stimuli depends
on conscious detection. The Journal of Neuroscience, 26, 948–952.
ead, H., & Holmes, H. G. (1911–1912). Sensory disturbances from cerebral lesions.
Brain, 34, 102–254.
olmes, N. P., & Spence, C. (2005). Beyond the body schema: Visual, prosthetic, and
technological contributions to bodily perception and awareness. In G. Knoblich,
I. M. Thornton, M. Grosjean, & M. Shiffrar (Eds.), Human body perception from the
inside out (pp. 15–64). New York: Oxford University Press.
urley, S. (1998). Consciousness in action. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
etswaart, M., Carey, D. P., & Della Sala, S. (2006). Tapping, grasping and aiming in
ideomotor apraxia. Neuropsychologia, 44, 1175–1184.
acob, P., & de Vignemont, F. (in press). Spatial coordinates and phenomenology in
the two-visual systems model. In N. Gangopadhyay (Ed.), Perception, action and
consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
akobson, L. S., & Goodale, M. A. (1991). Factors affecting higher-order move-
ment planning: A kinematic analysis of human prehension. Experimental BrainPlease cite this article in press as: de Vignemont, F. Body schem
doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2009.09.022
Research, 86, 199–208.
eannerod, M. (1997). The cognitive neuroscience of action. Oxford: Blackwell.
ammers,M. P., deVignemont, F., Verhagen, L., &Dijkerman,H. C. (2009). The rubber
hand illusion in action. Neuropsychologia, 47, 204–211.
ammers, M. P., Kootker, J. A., Hogendoorn, H., & Dijkerman, H. C. (submitted for
publication). How many motoric body representations can we grasp? PRESS
logia xxx (2009) xxx–xxx
Kammers, M. P., Mulder, J., de Vignemont, F., & Dijkerman, H. C. (2009). The weight
of representing the body: Addressing the potentially indeﬁnite number of body
representations in healthy individuals. Experimental Brain Research.
Kammers, M. P., van der Ham, I. J., & Dijkerman, H. C. (2006). Dissoci-
ating body representations in healthy individuals: Differential effects of
a kinaesthetic illusion on perception and action. Neuropsychologia, 44,
2430–2436.
Kinsbourne, M. (1995). Awareness of one’s own body: An attentional theory of its
nature, development, and brain basis. In J. L. Burmúdez, A. J. Marcel, & N. Eilan
(Eds.), The body and the self (pp. 205–223). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Kroliczak, G., Heard, P., Goodale, M. A., & Gregory, R. L. (2006). Dissociation of per-
ception and action unmasked by the hollow-face illusion. Brain Research, 1080,
9–16.
Lamme, V. A. F. (2003). Why visual attention and awareness are different. Trends in
Cognitive Sciences, 7, 12–18.
Mamassian, P., Landy, M., & Maloney, L. T. (2003). Bayesian modelling of visual per-
ception. In R. P. N. Rao, B. A. Olshausen, &M. S. Lewicki (Eds.), Probabilistic models
of the brain: Perception and neural function. Cambridge, MA: MIT press.
Marshall, J. C., &Halligan, P.W. (1988). Blindsight and insight invisuo-spatial neglect.
Nature, 336, 766–767.
McIntosh, R.D., Brodie, E. E., Beschin,N., &Robertson, I. H. (2000). Improving the clin-
ical diagnosis of personal neglect: A reformulated comb and razor test. Cortex,
36, 289–292.
Merleau-Ponty, M. (1945). Phénoménologie de la perception. Paris: Gallimard.
Milner, A. D., & Goodale, M. A. (1995). The visual brain in action. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Milner, A. D., & Goodale, M. A. (2008). Two visual systems reviewed. Neuropsycholo-
gia, 46, 774–785.
Noë, A. (2004). Action in perception. Cambridge: MIT Press.
O’Regan, K., & Noë, A. (2001). A sensorimotor account of vision and visual conscious-
ness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 24(5), pp. 939-101.
O’Shaughnessy, B. (1980). The will: Dual aspect theory. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
Paillard, J. (1980). Le corps situé et le corps identiﬁé. Une approche psychophysi-
ologique de la notion de schéma corporel. Revue Medicale de la Suisse Romande,
100, 129–141.
Paillard, J. (1991). Knowing where and knowing how to get there. In Brain and space
(pp. 461–481).
Paillard, J. (1999). Body schema and body image: A double dissociation in deaffer-
ented patients. In G. N. Gantchev, S.Mori, & J.Massion (Eds.),Motor control, today
and tomorrow , pp.197.214.
Paillard, J., Michel, F., & Stelmach, G. (1983). Localization without content. A tactile
analogue of ‘blind sight’. Archives of Neurology, 40, 548–551.
Parsons, L. M. (1987). Imagined spatial transformation of one’s body. Journal of
Experimental Psychology, 116, 172–191.
Petreska, B., Adriani,M., Blanke, O., & Billard, A. G. (2007). Apraxia: A review. Progress
in Brain Research, 164, 61–83.
Pisella, L., Binkofski, F., Lasek, K., Toni, I., & Rossetti, Y. (2006). No double-dissociation
between optic ataxia and visual agnosia: Multiple sub-streams for multiple
visuo-manual integrations. Neuropsychologia, 44, 2734–2748.
Pisella, L., Gréa, H., Tilikete, C., Vighetto, A., Desmurget, M., Rode, G., et al. (2000).
An ‘automatic pilot’ for the hand in human posterior parietal cortex: Toward a
reinterpretion of optic ataxia. Nature Neuroscience, 3, 729–736.
Poeck, K., & Orgass, B. (1964). On the development of the body image. Studies in
normal children, blind children and child amputees. Fortschritte der Neurologie,
Psychiatrie, und ihrer Grenzgebiete, 32, 538–555.
Poeck, K., & Orgass, B. (1971). The concept of the body schema: A critical review and
some experimental results. Cortex, 7, 254–277.
Pouget, A., Deneve, S., & Duhamel, J.-R. (2002). A computational perspective on
the neural basis of multisensory spatial representations. Nature Reviews Neu-
roscience, 3, 741–747.
Rode, G., Rossetti, Y., Li, L., & Boisson, D. (1998). Improvement of mental imagery
after prism exposure in neglect: A case study. Behavioural Neurology, 11,
251–258.
Rossetti, Y., Revol, P., McIntosh, R., Pisella, L., Rode, G., Danckert, J., et al.
(2005). Visually guided reaching: Bilateral posterior parietal lesions cause a
switch from fast visuomotor to slow cognitive control. Neuropsychologia, 43,
162–177.
Rossetti, Y., Rode, G., & Boisson, D. (1995). Implicit processing of somaes-
thetic information: A dissociation between where and how? Neuroreport, 6,
506–510.
Roy,A. C., Paulignan, Y.,Meunier,M., &Boussaoud,D. (2006). Prehensionmovements
in the macaque monkey: Effects of perturbation of object size and location.
Experimental Brain Research, 169, 182–193.
Schwoebel, J., Boronat, C. B., & Branch Coslett, H. (2002). The man who exe-
cuted “imagined”movements: Evidence for dissociable components of the body
schema. Brain and Cognition, 50, 1–16.
Schwoebel, J., & Coslett, H. B. (2005). Evidence for multiple, distinct representations
of the human body. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 17, 543–553.
Semenza, C., & Goodglass, H. (1985). Localization of body parts in brain injureda and body image—Pros and cons. Neuropsychologia (2009),
subjects. Neuropsychologia, 23, 161–175.
Simons, D. J., & Rensink, R. A. (2005). Change blindness: Past, present, and future.
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 9, 16–20.
Sirigu, A., Duhamel, J. R., Cohen, L., Pillon, B., Dubois, B., & Agid, Y. (1996). The mental
representation of hand movements after parietal cortex damage. Science, 273,
1564–1568.
 INGN
sycho
S
S
S
T
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.ARTICLEModelSY-3425; No.of Pages13
F. de Vignemont / Neurop
irigu, A., Grafman, J., Bressler, K., & Sunderland, T. (1991). Multiple representations
contribute to body knowledge processing. Evidence from a case of autotopag-
nosia. Brain, 114, 629–642.
meets, J. B., Brenner, E., de Grave, D. D., & Cuijpers, R. H. (2002). Illusions in action:
Consequences of inconsistent processingof spatial attributes.Experimental Brain
Research, 147, 135–144, pp. 205–223.Please cite this article in press as: de Vignemont, F. Body schem
doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2009.09.022
picker, S. F. T. (1975). The lived body as catalytic agent: Reaction at the interface of
medicine and philosophy. In H. R. Engelhardt, & S. F. Spicker (Eds.), Evaluation
and explanation in the biomedical sciences. Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing Co.
ravieso, D., Pilar, M. A., & Gomila, A. (2007). Haptic perception is a dynamic sys-
tem of cutaneous, proprioceptive, and motor components. Behavioral and Brain
Sciences, 30, 222–223. PRESS
logia xxx (2009) xxx–xxx 13
Tsakiris, M., & Haggard, P. (2005). The rubber hand illusion revisited: Visuotac-
tile integration and self-attribution. Journal of Experimental Psychology. Human
Perception and Performance, 31, 80–91.
Ungeleider, L. G., & Mishkin, M. (1982). Two cortical visual systems. In D. J. Ingle, M.
A. Goodale, & R. J. W. Mansﬁeld (Eds.), Analysis of visual behaviour (pp. 549–586).a and body image—Pros and cons. Neuropsychologia (2009),
Wallhagen, M. (2007). Consciousness and action: Does cognitive science support
(mild) epiphenomenalism? The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 58,
539–561.
Wolpert, D. M., Ghahramani, Z., & Flanagan, J. R. (2001). Perspectives and problems
in motor learning. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 5, 487–494.
